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Japan's high saving rate continues to attract much 
attention—and anxiety—particularly in the United 
States. It seems as if the Japanese, being obsessed with 
saving, continue to snap up wealth worldwide. If this 
trend were to continue, some say the Japanese would 
soon own most of the world. 
Three years ago I had a chance to examine the issue 
of Japan's high saving rate (see Hayashi 1986). I found 
that a substantial part—but not all—of the apparent 
saving rate gap between Japan and the United States is 
a statistical illusion attributable to differences in the 
way the two countries compile their national income 
accounts. Although no single theory could fully explain 
the remaining real difference in the saving rates, I felt 
that, on balance, the most promising explanation lay in 
the neoclassical view. This view associates a low level 
of initial wealth (Japan just after World War II) with a 
subsequent rapid accumulation of wealth (Japan in the 
1970s and 1980s). Based on this neoclassical view, I 
conjectured that once Japan's wealth approached the 
level of wealth in the United States, then the Japanese 
saving rate would gradually converge to the U.S. rate. 
Three recent developments have prompted me to 
reexamine the issue of Japan's high saving rate. First, 
events in the last few years do not seem to support my 
conjecture: although the Japanese personal and private 
saving rates declined a bit, the national saving rate 
actually rose. Second, in 1986 the U.S. national income 
and product accounts underwent a benchmark revision 
(not incorporated in Hayashi 1986) that raised the U.S. 
saving rate by as much as 2 percentage points in recent 
years. Third, early in 1989 the Japanese government 
published the long-awaited estimate of national income 
accounts from 1955 to 1969 (Japan 1989b), thus en-
abling me to extend the initial year of my analysis from 
1965 back to 1955. 
With these newly available data, I set about con-
structing the updated saving and wealth time series 
that are comparable between the two countries. (See 
Hayashi 1986 for details of the procedure used to adjust 
the data for comparability.) Once constructed, the new 
series revealed four noteworthy facts: 
• The new data confirm even more forcefully than 
the previous data that most of the apparent gap 
between the Japanese and U.S. saving rates is a 
statistical illusion. 
• Japan's postwar national saving rate shows a pro-
nounced hump shape, peaking around 1970 and 
then steadily declining to the stationary U.S. rate 
until about 1980. 
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3 • In the early 1980s, the two national saving rates 
diverge, with the two rates mirroring each other— 
the Japanese rate rising and the U.S. rate declining. 
• After an initial decline in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, Japan's wealth-to-income ratio (with land 
excluded) catches up with the U.S. ratio in 1987. 
Unfortunately, not all of these facts are consistent 
with the neoclassical view on which I based my con-
jecture. The hump-shaped Japanese saving rate doesn't 
match the path predicted by a standard neoclassical 
model (see the paper by Christiano in this issue). The 
divergence between the two countries' saving rates in 
the 1980s doesn't support my conjecture that the two 
rates would gradually converge. And the U-shaped de-
cline and rise in Japan's wealth-to-income ratio is also 
inconsistent with the neoclassical view that wealth 
starts low and rises rapidly. 
Are these discrepancies between the facts and the 
neoclassical perspective irreconcilable? Not neces-
sarily. I conclude by discussing how they might be 
reconciled. 
Adjusting for Differences in Accounts 
It is somewhat surprising to realize that even for two 
highly developed countries like Japan and the United 
States, the national income statistics are not directly 
comparable. Even an economic measure as basic as 
gross national product (GNP) does not translate directly 
between the two countries. As a result, simply taking 
the official statistics at face value and ignoring the 
differences in accounting practices could lead to con-
clusions that are quite misleading. 
Two of the most important differences in the way 
Japan and the United States compile their national 
income statistics involve how capital is depreciated and 
how government expenditures are categorized. 
First, in the Japanese national income accounts, 
reported depreciation is valued at historical costs rather 
than at replacement costs. So, at times of high inflation, 
historical-cost depreciation understates the loss in the 
value of assets due to depreciation. The difference 
between depreciation at replacement costs and depre-
ciation at historical costs is called a capital consumption 
adjustment. The U.S. national income accounts incor-
porate a capital consumption adjustment, but the 
Japanese national income accounts do not. As a result, 
Japanese saving is overstated by the amount of the 
capital consumption adjustment because 
(Net) Saving 
= Gross Saving 
— Depreciation at Replacement Costs 
= (Gross Saving 
— Depreciation at Historical Costs) 
— Capital Consumption Adjustment. 
It is possible, however, to infer Japan's implicit cap-
ital consumption adjustment from its national accounts, 
which include a section on balance sheets by sector at 
market prices. (See Hayashi 1986 for the procedure for 
using this information to estimate the capital consump-
tion adjustment and hence depreciation at replacement 
costs.) Briefly, I use the following procedure: 
Change in Market Value of Wealth 
= Gross Saving 
— Depreciation at Replacement Costs 
+ Capital Gains 
— Residual Losses. 
Gross saving and capital gains can be calculated from 
the Japanese national accounts. I measure replacement-
cost depreciation as gross saving plus capital gains 
minus the change in wealth, so that my measure in-
cludes residual losses.
1 
The second important difference in the two coun-
tries' accounting practices is that the U.S. national 
income accounts fail to recognize government capital 
formation, whereas the Japanese accounts do. In other 
words, all U.S. government expenditures are classified 
as consumption, so government saving is simply the net 
increase in financial assets (that is, budget surpluses). 
This difference implies that even GNP is not directly 
comparable between the United States and Japan 
because Japanese GNP includes service flows from the 
government's tangible assets. 
To make these statistics comparable, I had a choice: 
I could either add government capital formation to 
government saving for the United States or subtract 
government capital formation from government saving 
for Japan. I chose to subtract from Japan's government 
saving because it is necessarily arbitrary to divide U.S. 
government expenditures between the consumption 
^here is no way to separate out the residual losses component from my 
estimate of depreciation using the Japanese national accounts. Residual losses 
include things like loss of wealth due to natural disasters. Such losses should be 
negligible for normal periods. 
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and investment components. This adjustment implies a 
big reduction in government saving for Japan, where 
capital formation by the government has been about 
5.7 percent of GNP between 1970 and 1987.
2 The 
adjustment also affects Japan's GNP and net national 
product (NNP) because the service flow from govern-
ment capital has to be removed. For instance, reported 
GNP in 1987 was 345 trillion yen, but my adjustment 
lowers that estimate to 332 trillion yen. 
Observing Real Differences in Saving 
The data used in this study cover the years 1955-1987 
and are taken from the following sources: the Eco-
nomic Report of the President (U.S. President 1989), the 
Annual Report on National Accounts, 1989 (Japan 
1989a), and the Report on National Accounts from 1955 
to 1969 (Japan 1989b). To make valid comparisons 
between Japanese and U.S. saving rates, I adjusted the 
Japanese data, taking into account the differences just 
discussed. 
To emphasize the impact of the data adjustment, 
Chart 1 shows the unadjusted and adjusted versions of 
the Japanese national saving rate versus the U.S. 
national saving rate. The difference between the ad-
justed and unadjusted Japanese rates (shaded) is the 
result of accounting for the capital consumption ad-
justment and government capital formation. To people 
unaware of the differences in national income account-
ing, the discrepancy between Japan's unadjusted saving 
rate and the U.S. rate appears quite substantial—even 
ominous. But by now it should be clear that most of the 
apparent discrepancy is due to accounting differences 
between the two countries. 
In Chart 1, the adjusted data show that Japan's 
national saving rate, after its big surge around 1970, 
converges to the stationary U.S. saving rate toward 
the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, the two 
saving rates diverge, with Japan's rate rising and the 
U.S. rate declining. 
To gain a better understanding of why Japan's 
national saving rate moved as it did, I divide it into its 
two components: private and government saving rates. 
The adjusted rates for private saving are plotted in 
Chart 2. The chart shows that the U.S. private saving 
rate has been remarkably stable until about 1985. In 
contrast, the Japanese private saving rate has been 
relatively volatile, exhibiting a pronounced peak 
around 1970 before tapering off in subsequent years. 
Chart 2 shows a notable feature of Japan's private 
saving—its low rate in the mid-1950s, particularly in 
1956 and 1957. This feature is puzzling because the 
Charts 1 and 2 
Japanese and U.S. Saving Rates, 1955-1987 
Chart 1 National Saving 
% of NNP 
35 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Chart 2 Private Saving 










—  ^AfAdjusted) _ 
United States -
Japanese Government \ 
i 
(Adjusted) 
i I 1 i  i i 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Note: For a description of the procedure used to adjust the saving rates 
for comparability, see Hayashi 1986. 
Sources of basic data: Japan 1989a,b and U.S. President 1989 
2This figure of 5.7 percent, which is taken from the Japanese national 
accounts, is overstated for two reasons. First, except for buildings, depreciation 
for government assets are zero (or, more precisely, depreciation is one-hoss-
shay and the scrap value is placed in the reconciliation accounts). Second, for 
buildings, no capital consumption adjustment is made. If the overstatement is 
adjusted, then the ratio of government capital formation to GNP for 1970-87 
falls to 3.6 percent. 
5 gross private saving rate (the ratio of gross private 
saving to NNP) for those two years is higher than in 
other years in the late 1950s. But the (net) saving for 
those two years was low because depreciation was 
extraordinarily large (perhaps due to the residual losses 
component of my estimate of depreciation). For ex-
ample, the ratio of depreciation to NNP in 1957 was 
32 percent—large enough to bring net private saving 
down to zero. I suspect, however, that the data reported 
for the early years of the sample should not be 
considered totally reliable. (I return to this issue of 
reliability later on.) 
Chart 2 also shows the Japanese government's 
adjusted saving rate (the ratio of budget surpluses to 
NNP). In the mid-1970s, the Japanese government 
started running budget deficits that, as a fraction of 
NNP, were larger than the U.S. budget deficits of the 
early 1980s. According to a principle known as the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem, deficits signal future 
tax increases, forcing households to increase their 
saving for future tax payments; therefore, deficits 
should be matched yen-for-yen by increased private 
saving. But the Japanese experience of the mid-1970s 
lends only partial support for Ricardian equivalence. 
Although private saving started to increase then, the 
increase was far from one-for-one with the deficits. 
That Japanese private saving failed to offset budget 
deficits in the mid-1970s can be seen by referring to 
Chart 1, which shows a continued decline in Japan's 
national saving rate. 
Proponents of Ricardian equivalence could argue 
that the declining trend in Japan's national saving rate 
might have occurred even if the government had chosen 
not to run deficits at that time. However, the same 
argument would have trouble explaining the behavior 
of Japan's national saving rate in the 1980s, when the 
declining trend in national saving was reversed in 1983, 
precisely when budget deficits started to improve 
rapidly. Therefore, one explanation of the divergence of 
the two national saving rates in the 1980s is the 
difference in fiscal policies between the two countries. 
Examining Differences in Wealth 
The saving rates examined so far do not account for the 
other component of wealth changes: capital gains. If the 
reason for saving is to increase wealth, it doesn't matter 
whether a wealth increase is due to acquisition of assets 
or to capital gains. This suggests that I should replace 
saving by saving plus capital gains in the previous 
discussion. Unfortunately, capital gains are very vola-
tile, so that including them would obscure basic trends 
in wealth accumulation. However, capital gains tend to 
average out, so the level of wealth should reflect these 
basic trends. 
Chart 3 plots the ratio of national wealth (at the 
beginning of each year) to income (GNP) for the United 
States and Japan. National wealth consists of tangible 
assets (inventories, depreciable assets, and land) and net 
claims on foreigners. To be consistent with my defini-
tion of saving, I exclude government tangible assets 
from national wealth. The data on wealth for the United 
States are taken from the Balance Sheets for the U.S. 
Economy, 1949-88, compiled by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (FR Board 1989). 
The Japanese wealth data are taken from the balance 
sheets section in the annual reports on national accounts 
(Japan 1989a,b). To make the wealth series for the 
two countries comparable as well as consistent with the 
saving series, I also exclude consumer durables from 
wealth. 
For a growing economy in a steady state, the wealth-
to-income ratio should be constant. If the economy is 
on a path converging to a steady state from an initial 
low level of wealth, the ratio should be increasing. As 
seen in Chart 3, the U.S. wealth-to-income ratio is fairly 
constant—a fact consistent with the presumption that 
the U.S. economy has been in a steady state. The 
Japanese wealth-to-income ratio has been rising ex-
cept in the early years of the sample period, but since 
then its level has far exceeded the U.S. level. This rise 
reflects the increasing share of land as a component of 
Japanese wealth. For 1987, about two-thirds of Japan's 
wealth was land, whereas the corresponding share for 
the United States was one-fourth.
3 
Land, however, is not a reproducible asset. Since its 
stock is fixed, land cannot be increased at the national 
level. Ando (1986) argues that for the purpose of 
international comparison, a better measure of wealth 
might be wealth exclusive of land. This measure of 
wealth can, in fact, be justified theoretically, since 
nonreproducible assets can be incorporated in a stan-
dard neoclassical growth model. 
In a standard growth model, the nation's objective is 
to maximize the discounted sum of utility flows 
(1) X7=o P'u(ct) 
subject to the capital accumulation constraint 
3According to the Japanese national accounts, the value of Japanese land 
(excluding government land) in 1987 was 1,554 trillion yen for Japan and 
$3.4 trillion for the United States. Thus, at the current exchange rate, private 
land is worth three times more in Japan than it is in the United States. 
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Charts 3 and 4 
The Wealth-to-income Ratios for Japan and the United States, 1955-1987 
Chart 3 With Land Chart 4 Without Land 
Note: Consumer durables and government tangible assets are excluded from the definition of wealth. 
Sources of basic data: FR Board 1989, Japan 1989a,b 
kt+\ =f(kt)-ct-8kt 
where 
/} = a discount factor 
ct = consumption at time t 
u(ct) — utility of consumption 
kt — the stock of reproducible assets at time t 
f(kt) = output as a function of capital 
6 = the physical depreciation rate. 
As is well known, the wealth-to-income ratio ktlf(kt) 
converges monotonically to a steady-state value in the 
neoclassical growth model. Land could enter the model 
in one of two ways: through the production function 
/(•) or through the objective function w(-). For the ob-
jective function case, assume that the utility from land 
is additive, so the nation's objective function is 
(2) j3'[w(c,) + v(/)] 
where 
/ = the stock of land 
v(/)= utility of land. 
Since land is nonreproducible, for the nation as a whole 
there is no accumulation equation for land. Further-
more, since / is given, the optimal plan for consump-
tion and accumulation of reproducible wealth, {ct, kt} 
for t = 0,1,2,..., for model (1) is also optimal for model 
(2). Thus, the standard neoclassical growth model is 
applicable to an economy with land, provided that the 
land component is excluded from wealth and output 
measures. 
The empirical counterpart of kt is the nation's wealth 
exclusive of nonreproducible assets (land). This mea-
sure is the sum of inventories, depreciable assets, and 
net claims on foreigners. To obtain a corresponding out-
put measure, I must subtract from GNP the service flows 
from land. The U.S. national income accounts, how-
ever, do not contain a direct measure of these service 
7 flows. So instead, as a first approximation, I use the 
housing component (including imputed rent from 
owner-occupied housing) of personal consumption ex-
penditures.
4 I subtract this component from GNP to 
obtain an empirical counterpart of output f(kt). 
The wealth-to-income ratios thus adjusted for the 
two countries are displayed in Chart 4. The U.S. ratio is 
virtually unaffected by the land adjustment. (Note that 
the recent U.S. wealth-to-income ratio is not low by 
historical standards.) But, as expected, adjusting the 
data to remove land changes the picture for Japan 
drastically from the one shown in Chart 3. Now it 
appears that the Japanese wealth-to-income ratio has 
been converging to the U.S. ratio from below. This is 
precisely the prediction of the neoclassical growth 
model for an economy starting from a low level of 
wealth. Despite the increase in the Japanese national 
saving rate in recent years, Japan's wealth-to-income 
ratio has remained stable. This is mainly due to the 
large nominal capital loss on net foreign claims because 
of the recent depreciation of the dollar against the yen. 
That loss is about 5 percent of NNP for 1986 and 3.5 
percent of NNP for 1987. 
The early years of the sample period show a decline 
in Japan's wealth-to-income ratio, but this decline is 
inconsistent with the neoclassical view. The decline, 
however, seems to be due to large depreciation on 
depreciable assets, which form the bulk of national 
wealth. As mentioned earlier, the change in depreciable 
wealth can be broken down into three components: 
gross saving plus capital gains less my measure of 
depreciation, which includes replacement-cost depre-
ciation and residual losses. It is this third component 
that is unusually large for the early years of the sample. 
The size of this component certainly casts serious 
doubt on my estimate of depreciation. To pursue this 
issue a bit further, I calculate the implicit depreciation 
rate—the ratio of depreciation to the value of national 
depreciable assets at the beginning of each year. If the 
physical depreciation rate is constant for each asset 
type and if the composition of depreciable assets 
doesn't change over time, then the implicit depreciation 
rate should be constant. From 1970 to 1987, the 
calculated implicit rate for Japan is a very smooth 
declining series with a mean of about 12 percent. As 
I argue in Hayashi 1986, the decline reflects the shift in 
the composition of assets from short- to long-lived 
assets, and the residual losses component of my esti-
mate of depreciation is indeed negligible. However, 
from 1955 to 1969, the implicit depreciation rate is 
much more volatile, with a much higher mean of 20 
percent. The residual losses component of depreciation 
cannot explain the high implicit depreciation rate 
because, by definition, it should average out to zero. 
Although some part of the high depreciation rate 
must be real (due to the lower quality of physical assets 
acquired during the aftermath of World War II), I 
suspect that the remaining part is a statistical illusion. 
I think it likely that Japan's initial wealth in 1955 is 
grossly overestimated. The wealth series in the Japanese 
national accounts is based on the government's separate 
surveys on the stock of wealth for some benchmark 
years. It is possible that the 1955 wealth estimate is so 
large that assets must be depreciated rapidly to be 
consistent with subsequent benchmark wealth esti-
mates. 
Reconciling Differences 
Between Theory and Facts 
This paper has examined saving and wealth accumula-
tion over the last three decades for the United States and 
Japan. The United States can be characterized as an 
economy in a steady state whose saving rate is just 
enough to maintain a constant level of the wealth-to-
income ratio. Only very recently has Japan reached the 
same stage of economic growth. The wealth-to-income 
ratio, adjusted to exclude land, is now roughly the same 
for the two countries—at slightly above 2, or at about 
the historical average of the U.S. ratio. If we subscribe 
to the standard neoclassical growth model, this ratio is 
the equilibrium level of the wealth-to-income ratio for 
both countries. 
I have observed that Japan's national saving rate 
exhibits a pronounced hump shape, peaking around 
1970 and then steadily declining toward the U.S. rate 
until about 1980. The paper by Christiano (in this issue) 
demonstrates that it may be plausible to reconcile this 
pattern with the neoclassical view. 
Regarding the mirror-image divergence of the two 
countries' national saving rates in the 1980s, two 
interpretations are possible. The neoclassical view is 
that the current U.S. wealth-to-income ratio, which is 
considerably lower than it was in the late 1970s due to 
the decreased national saving rate, is the equilibrium 
rate. In contrast, Japan's national saving rate had to 
increase over the last few years to maintain the Japanese 
4My adjustment using the housing component of personal consumption 
expenditures is slightly inconsistent because the housing component includes 
imputed and cash rent from housing structures. However, a proper adjustment 
would make very little difference for the wealth-to-income ratio because the 
impact of the adjustment mainly occurs in the numerator. 
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wealth-to-income ratio in the face of the large capital 
losses on net foreign claims. According to this neo-
classical view, the saving rate gap between the two 
countries should disappear in the next few years. 
The second interpretation is based on the contrasting 
behavior of government saving in the two countries. If 
the private sector fails to offset changes in government 
saving, a reduction in budget deficits translates into an 
increase in national saving. Thus, the saving rate gap is 
a reflection of the difference in fiscal policy between the 
two countries. If this second view is correct, a substan-
tial reduction in the U.S. budget deficit is needed to 
shore up the slumping U.S. national saving rate. 
Perhaps the biggest embarrassment to the neoclas-
sical view is the U-shaped wealth-to-income ratio for 
Japan, rather than a ratio that rises steadily from an 
initial low level. However, as I stressed earlier, the 
declining part of the U-shape might well be due to 
measurement error, in which case the neoclassical view 
may still prevail. 
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